Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
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- Rao, Neel, 2015. "General training in labor markets: Common value auctions with unobservable investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 19-45.
- Jacquemet, Nicolas & Koessler, Frédéric, 2013.
"Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 103-120.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11002, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2013. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-00773412, HAL.
- Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00565157, HAL.
- Schweinzer, Paul, 2010. "Sequential bargaining with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 109-121, January.
- David Malueg & Ram Orzach, 2012. "Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 219-254, May.
- Alejandro Francetich, 2013. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 501, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Harrison Cheng & Guofu Tan, 2010. "Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 253-290, October.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
- Dennis Clerck & Erik Demeulemeester, 2016. "A sequential procurement model for a PPP project pipeline," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 38(2), pages 427-457, March.
- Amir Danak & Shie Mannor, 2012. "Approximately optimal bidding policies for repeated first-price auctions," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 189-199, July.
- Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2013. "Asymmetric Multiple-Object First-Price Auctions," School of Economics Working Papers 2013-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
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