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The Role of Media Slant in Elections and Economics

  • John Duggan

    ()

    (W. Allen Wallis Institute of Political Economy, 107 Harkness Hall, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627-0158)

  • César Martinelli

    ()

    (Centro de Investigación Económica, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)

We formalize the concept of media slant as a relative emphasis on di¤erent issues of political interest by the media, and we illustrate the e¤ects of the media choice of slant on political outcomes and economic decisions in a rational expectations model. In a two-candidate elec- tion, if the media is biased in favor of the underdog, then it will put more emphasis on issues with a large electoral impact, hoping that the news will deliver an upset victory. Whether citizens are better o¤ with media biased in favor of the underdog or the frontrunner de- pends on the importance of choosing the .right.candidate for citizens versus the impact of political news on the private economic decisions of voters. Balanced media, giving each issue equal coverage, may be worse for voters than partisan media.

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File URL: http://www.wallis.rochester.edu/WallisPapers/wallis_54.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP54.

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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:wallis:wp54
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Rochester, Wallis Institute, Harkness 109B Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

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