IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle

  • Wataru Tamura

    (The University of Tokyo)

Registered author(s):

    This paper examines an auction platform in which the platform provider maximizes profits by adjusting participation fees and by choosing an auction format. The seller has private information on the quality of the good, and each participating buyer receives a private signal about his valuation of the good. The choice of auction format determines the allocation of trading surplus among participating seller and buyers. This paper shows that when the seller’s type is affiliated with buyers’ signals, the platform provider can charge higher participation fees to both sides by choosing a first-price auction rather than a second-price or English auction. It also examines the effect of allowing participating buyers to acquire information on the seller’s type and shows that the provider can charge higher participation fees under a non-transparency policy.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/pdf/workingpaper/fseries/F330.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo in its series CARF F-Series with number CARF-F-330.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 22 pages
    Date of creation: Oct 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf330
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033
    Phone: +81-3-5841-0682
    Web page: http://www.carf.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/english/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Alexander Matros & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2006. "Optimal Mechanisms for an Auction Mediator," Discussion Paper Series dp424, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Patrick Bajari & Ali Horta�su, 2004. "Economic Insights from Internet Auctions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(2), pages 457-486, June.
    3. Gaudeul, Alexandre & Jullien, Bruno, 2005. "E-Commerce, Two-Sided Markets and Info-Mediation," IDEI Working Papers 380, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    4. Péter Eső & Bal�zs Szentes, 2007. "Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 705-731.
    5. E. Glen Weyl, 2010. "A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1642-72, September.
    6. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:668-691 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Cristián Troncoso Valverde, 2011. "Information Provision in Competing Auctions," Working Papers 25, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Martin Pesendorfer, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1323, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    9. Jullien, Bruno & Mariotti, Thomas, 2002. "Auction and the Informed Seller Problem," IDEI Working Papers 145, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Oct 2004.
    10. Marc Rysman, 2009. "The Economics of Two-Sided Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 125-43, Summer.
    11. Axel Ockenfels & David Reiley & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2006. "Online Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Kevin Hasker & Robin Sickles, 2010. "eBay in the Economic Literature: Analysis of an Auction Marketplace," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 3-42, August.
    13. Stephan Lauermann & Gábor Virág, 2012. "Auctions in Markets: Common Outside Options and the Continuation Value Effect," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 107-30, November.
    14. Jean Tirole & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2006. "Two-Sided Markets : A Progress Report," Post-Print hal-00173715, HAL.
    15. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:645-667 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Alex Gershkov, 2009. "Optimal auctions and information disclosure," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 335-344, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cfi:fseres:cf330. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.