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Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions

  • Ginger Zhe Jin
  • Marc Rysman

We study a new data set of US sports card conventions in order to evaluate the pricing theory of two-sided markets. Conventions are two-sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers. We have detailed information on consumer price, dealer price and, since most conventions are local, the market structure for conventions. We present several findings: first, consumer pricing decreases with competition at any reasonable distance, but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition. Second, when consumer price is zero (and thus constrained), dealer price decreases more strongly with competition. These results are compatible with existing models of two-sided markets, but are difficult to explain without such models.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 17959.

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Date of creation: Mar 2012
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Publication status: published as Ginger Zhe Jin & Marc Rysman, 2015. "Platform Pricing at Sports Card Conventions," The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol 63(4), pages 704-735.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17959
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  1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Triole, 2002. "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," FMG Discussion Papers dp409, Financial Markets Group.
  2. Chandra, Ambarish & Collard-Wexler, Allan, 2008. "Mergers in Two-Sided Markets: An Application to the Canadian Newspaper Industry," MPRA Paper 7954, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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  15. Wright Julian, 2010. "Why Do Merchants Accept Payment Cards?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 1-8, August.
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  18. Marc Rysman, 2004. "Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow Pages," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 483-512.
  19. Gary Chamberlain, 1980. "Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 225-238.
  20. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2007. "Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 353-380, August.
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