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Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Armstrong

    ()

  • Julian Wright

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2007. "Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 353-380, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:32:y:2007:i:2:p:353-380
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0114-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February.
    2. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2014. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 10.
    3. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing cybermediaries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 797-808, May.
    4. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. GABSZEWICZ, Jean & WAUTHY, Xavier, 2004. "Two-sided markets and price competition with multi-homing," CORE Discussion Papers 2004030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-sided markets; Network externalities; Exclusive contracts; D43; D62; L13;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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