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Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Peitz, Martin
  • Rady, Sven
  • Trepper, Piers

Abstract

We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided mar- ket. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two sides are approximately symmetric. If the externality that one side exerts is sufficiently well known and weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prices when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal pol- icy does not admit closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form.

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File URL: https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/32932/1/Peitz%2C_Rady%2C_Trepper13-03.pdf
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Paper provided by University of Mannheim, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 13-03.

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Date of creation: 2013
Handle: RePEc:mnh:wpaper:32932
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Keywords: Two-Sided Market ; Network Effects ; Monopoly Experimentation ; Bayesian Learning ; Optimal Control;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
  • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
  • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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