Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital
The authors introduce a dynamic and fully strategic model of wage determination in the presence of firm-specific human capital. In this model, human capital is interpreted as information. The authors show that equilibrium exists and is efficient and that it gives rise to a unique distribution of the social surplus. They show further that the equilibrium wage is determined by three factors. Consideration of these factors allows the authors to determine when and how the market mechanism enables the worker to capture some of the returns to firm-specific human capital. They relate their findings to the ongoing empirical debate concerning the return to tenure. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kenneth Burdett & Dale T. Mortensen, 1989. "Equilibrium Wage Differentials and Employer Size," Discussion Papers 860, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bertola, Giuseppe & Felli, Leonardo, 1993. "Job matching and the distribution of producer surplus," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 65-92, March.
- Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979.
"Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
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