Two-sided markets and price competition with multi-homing
We model duopoly competition between two platforms.They operate in a two-sided market where agents are heterogeneous on both sides of the market and are allowed to mulithome. Network effects are captured within a vertical differentiation framework.Under single-homing there exists an interior equilibrium where networks exhibit asymmetric sizes and both firms enjoy positive profits.When all agents are allowed to patronize the two platforms, we show that in equilibrium multi-homing takes place on one side of the market only. Moreover, the only equilibrium exhibiting positive profits for both platforms replicates the collusive outcome.
|Date of creation:||00 May 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & WAUTHY, Xavier Y., 2001.
"The option of joint purchase in vertically differentiated markets,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Jean J. Gabszewicz & Xavier Y. Wauthy, 2003. "The option of joint purchase in vertically differentiated markets," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 817-829, November.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & WAUTHY, Xavier Y., . "The option of joint purchase in vertically differentiated markets," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1667, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Wauthy, X., 1994.
"Quality Choice in Models of Vertical Differentiation,"
Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales)
1994033, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Wauthy, Xavier, 1996. "Quality Choice in Models of Vertical Differentiation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 345-53, September.
- Hausman, Jerry A & Leonard, Gregory K & Tirole, Jean, 2003.
" On Nonexclusive Membership in Competing Joint Ventures,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 43-62, Spring.
- Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard & Jean Tirole, 2003. "On Non-Exclusive Membership in Competing Joint Ventures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000145, David K. Levine.
- Evans David S., 2003. "Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-19, September.
- Graeme Guthrie & Julian Wright, 2003. "Competing Payment Schemes," Departmental Working Papers wp0311, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2004030. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.