Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries
The object of this paper is to discuss on-line intermediation from the perspective of two-sided markets. It builds a simple model of the intermediation activity when trading partners are involved in a commercial relationship and uses it to illustrate some of the results that emerge in the two-sided market literature, as well as to discuss some new aspects. The first part concentrates on a monopoly intermediation service and discusses both efficient pricing and monopoly pricing. The second part discusses the nature of competition between intermediaries, addressing issues as competitive crosssubsidies, multi-homing or tying.
|Date of creation:||2004|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing with Network Externalities and Price Discrimination," CEPR Discussion Papers 2883, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Attila Ambrus & Rossella Argenziano, 2004.
"Network Markets and Consumers Coordination,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1481, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Attila Ambrus & Rosella Argenziano, 2004. "Network Markets and Consumer Coordination," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0423, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
- Attila Ambrus & Rossella Argenziano, 2004. "Network Markets and Consumer Coordination," CESifo Working Paper Series 1317, CESifo Group Munich.
- Rochet, Jean Charles & Tirole, Jean, 2008. "Tying in two-sided markets and the honor all cards rule," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1333-1347, November.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 2006. "Tying in Two-Sided Markets and the Honor All Cards Rule," IDEI Working Papers 440, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2007.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 2007. "Tying-in Two-Sided Markets and the Honour All Cards Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 6132, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2014. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 10.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, 06.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Triole, 2002. "Platform competition in two sided markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24929, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Triole, 2002. "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," FMG Discussion Papers dp409, Financial Markets Group.
- Rochet, Jean-Charles & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," IDEI Working Papers 152, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Wright, Julian, 2003. "Optimal card payment systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 587-612, August.
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- Pashigian, B Peter & Gould, Eric D, 1998. "Internalizing Externalities: The Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 115-142, April.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. " Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-328, Summer.
- Jorge A, Ferrando & Jean J, Gabszewicz & Didier Laussel & Nathalie Sonnac, 2004. "Two-Sided Network Effects and Competition : An Application to Media Industries," Working Papers 2004-09, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 454-474, June.
- Innes, Robert & Sexton, Richard J., 1993. "Customer coalitions, monopoly price discrimination and generic entry deterrence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1569-1597, December.
- Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing cybermediaries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 797-808, May.
- GABSZEWICZ, Jean & WAUTHY, Xavier, 2004. "Two-sided markets and price competition with multi-homing," CORE Discussion Papers 2004030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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