A Dynamic Oligopoly Structural Model for the Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration
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Other versions of this item:
- Andrew T. Ching, 2010. "A Dynamic Oligopoly Structural Model For The Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1175-1207, November.
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KeywordsDynamic Oligopoly; Consumer Learning; Pharmaceutical Industry;
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-10-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HEA-2004-10-30 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IND-2004-11-22 (Industrial Organization)
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