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Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information

  • Jullien, Bruno
  • Pavan, Alessandro

We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users' preferences. We first show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns and product design affecting the agents' ability to estimate their own valuations and/or the distribution of valuations on the other side of the market.

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 793.

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Date of creation: Aug 2013
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Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:27580
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  1. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2014. "Many-to-Many Matching and Price Discrimination," Discussion Papers 1578, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Simon P. Anderson & R�gis Renault, 2006. "Advertising Content," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 93-113, March.
  3. Amelio, Andrea & Jullien, Bruno, 2012. "Tying and freebies in two-sided markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 436-446.
  4. E. Glen Weyl, 2010. "A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1642-72, September.
  5. Hanna Halaburda & Yaron Yehezkel, 2011. "Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 11-05, NET Institute, revised Sep 2011.
  6. Attila Ambrus & Emilio Calvano & Markus Reisinger, 2014. "Either or Both Competition: A "Two-sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships," CSEF Working Papers 378, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  7. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. " Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-28, Summer.
  8. Susan Athey & Emilio Calvano & Joshua Gans, 2013. "The Impact of the Internet on Advertising Markets for News Media," NBER Working Papers 19419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," NBER Working Papers 2995, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Ambrus, Attila & Argenziano, Rossella, 2009. "Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets," Scholarly Articles 3204916, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. repec:hrv:faseco:4589709 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Mitchell, Matthew F., 2005. "Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Shares," Research Papers 1879, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  13. Luís Cabral, 2007. "Dynamic Price Competition with Network Effects," Working Papers 22, Portuguese Competition Authority.
  14. Carlsson, H. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Global Games And Equilibrium Selection," Papers 9052, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  15. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing cybermediaries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 797-808, May.
  16. Mark Armstrong & Julian Wright, 2007. "Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 353-380, August.
  17. Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2009. "Comparative advertising: disclosing horizontal match information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 558-581.
  18. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1986. "A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 366-376, Autumn.
  19. Andrei Hagiu, 2009. "Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(4), pages 1011-1043, December.
  20. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154416 is not listed on IDEAS
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