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Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information

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  • Hanna Halaburda
  • Yaron Yehezkel

Abstract

We consider platform competition in a two-sided market, where the two sides (buyers and sellers) have ex-ante uncertainty and ex-post asymmetric information concerning the value of a new technology. We fi nd that platform competition may lead to a market failure: competition may result in a lower level of trade and lower welfare than a monopoly, if the diff erence in the degree of asymmetric information between the two side is below a certain threshold. Multi-homing solves the market failure resulting from asymmetric information. However, if platforms can impose exclusive dealing, then they will do so, which results in market inefficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanna Halaburda & Yaron Yehezkel, 2013. "Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 22-68, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:3:p:22-68
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.3.22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. E. Glen Weyl, 2010. "A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1642-1672, September.
    2. repec:hrv:faseco:4589709 is not listed on IDEAS
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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