Platform Competition under Asymmetric Information
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References listed on IDEAS
- E. Glen Weyl, 2010. "A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1642-1672, September.
- repec:hrv:faseco:4589709 is not listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Jullien, Bruno & Pavan, Alessandro, 2013. "Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information," IDEI Working Papers 793, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Mark J. McCabe & Christopher M. Snyder, 2016. "Open Access as a Crude Solution to a Hold-up Problem in the Two-Sided Market for Academic Journals," NBER Working Papers 22220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hagiu, Andrei & Wright, Julian, 2015. "Multi-sided platforms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 162-174.
- Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Tremblay, Mark J., 2014. "Homogeneous platform competition with endogenous homing," DICE Discussion Papers 166, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Gary Biglaiser & Jacques Crémer, 2016. "The Value of Incumbency in Heterogeneous Platforms," CESifo Working Paper Series 5829, CESifo Group Munich.
- Sagit Bar-Gill, 2013. "Game of Platforms: Strategic Expansion in Two-Sided Markets," Working Papers 13-12, NET Institute.
- Halaburda, Hanna & Jullien, Bruno & Yehezkel, Yaron, 2016.
"Dynamic Competition with Network Externalities: Why History Matters,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
11205, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Halaburda, Hanna & Jullien, Bruno & Yehezkel, Yaron, 2016. "Dynamic Competition with Network Externalities: Why History Matters," TSE Working Papers 16-636, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2018.
- Hanna Halaburda & Bruno Jullien & Yaron Yehezkel, 2016. "Dynamic Competition with Network Externalities: Why History Matters," CESifo Working Paper Series 5847, CESifo Group Munich.
- Biglaiser, Gary & Crémer, Jacques, 2016. "The value of incumbency in heterogeneous platforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 11207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hanna Hałaburda & Yaron Yehezkel, 2016.
"The Role of Coordination Bias in Platform Competition,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 274-312, April.
- Hanna Halaburda & Yaron Yehezkel, 2012. "The Role of Coordination Bias in Platform Competition," Working Papers 12-03, NET Institute, revised Sep 2012.
- Hagiu, Andrei & Hałaburda, Hanna, 2014. "Information and two-sided platform profits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 25-35.
- Andrei Hagiu & Daniel Spulber, 2013. "First-Party Content and Coordination in Two-Sided Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 933-949, April.
- Biglaiser, Gary & Crémer, Jacques, 2016. "The value of incumbency for heterogeneous platforms," TSE Working Papers 16-630, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Nov 2016.
- Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, 2015. "Marketplace or Reseller?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(1), pages 184-203, January.
More about this item
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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