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Dynamic competition with network externalities: how history matters

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  • Hanna Halaburda
  • Bruno Jullien
  • Yaron Yehezkel

Abstract

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes “focal” in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they join the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher‐quality competition, can a low‐quality platform remain focal? In the finite‐horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for “patient” platforms; with an infinite time horizon, however, there are multiple equilibria where either the low‐ or high‐quality platform dominates. If qualities are stochastic, the platform with a better average quality wins with a higher probability, even when its realized quality is lower, and this probability increases as platforms become more patient. Hence, social welfare may decline as platforms become more forward looking.

Suggested Citation

  • Hanna Halaburda & Bruno Jullien & Yaron Yehezkel, 2020. "Dynamic competition with network externalities: how history matters," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 3-31, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:51:y:2020:i:1:p:3-31
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12304
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    Cited by:

    1. Crémer, Jacques & Biglaiser, Gary & Mantovani, Andrea, 2024. "The Economics of the Cloud," TSE Working Papers 24-1520, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Guillem Roig, 2021. "Collusive equilibria with switching costs: The effect of consumer concentration," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 100-121, February.
    3. Jullien, Bruno & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2021. "The Economics of Platforms: A Theory Guide for Competition Policy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    4. repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_428v2 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Bruno Jullien & Alessandro Pavan & Marc Rysman, 2021. "Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects," Post-Print hal-03828345, HAL.
    6. Tremblay, Mark J. & Adachi, Takanori & Sato, Susumu, 2023. "Cournot platform competition with mixed-homing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    7. Jan Frederic Nerbel & Markus Kreutzer, 2023. "Digital platform ecosystems in flux: From proprietary digital platforms to wide-spanning ecosystems," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 33(1), pages 1-20, December.
    8. Axel Gautier & Jean-Christophe Poudou, 2025. "Dynamic Platform Competition 'In' and 'For' the Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 12218, CESifo.
    9. Sebastian Wai, 2022. "Software quality and backward compatibility in the video game industry," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 49(3), pages 545-570, September.
    10. Yang Xu & Xu Wang & Qiang Zhou, 2023. "Pricing and Quality Strategies in Crowdfunding with Network Externality," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 98-125, January.
    11. Jacques Crémer & Gary Biglaiser & André Veiga, 2022. "Should I stay or should I go? Migrating away from an incumbent platform," Post-Print hal-03792918, HAL.
    12. Yannis Bakos & Hanna Halaburda, 2022. "Overcoming the Coordination Problem in New Marketplaces via Cryptographic Tokens," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1368-1385, December.
    13. Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, 2023. "Data‐enabled learning, network effects, and competitive advantage," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 54(4), pages 638-667, December.
    14. Crémer, Jacques & Biglaiser, Gary & Veiga, André, 2022. "Should I stay or should I go? Migrating away from an incumbent platform," TSE Working Papers 21-1281, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    15. Kevin J. Boudreau & Lars Bo Jeppesen & Milan Miric, 2022. "Competing on freemium: Digital competition with network effects," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(7), pages 1374-1401, July.
    16. Jay Pil Choi & Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2022. "Network Externalities, Dominant Value Margins, And Equilibrium Uniqueness," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1805-1827, November.
    17. Klaus-Heiner Röhl & Joachim Ragnitz & Ulrich Walwei & Timo Wollmershäuser & Justus Haucap & Jarko Fidrmuc & Florian Horky & Philipp Reichle & Fabian Reck & Birgit Felden, 2021. "Die Post-Covid-19-Wirtschaft: Welche unerwarteten Spuren hinterlässt die Krise in Branchen, Regionen und Strukturen," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 74(03), pages 03-25, March.
    18. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani & Lorenzo Zirulia, 2025. "Platform investment and seller competition in two-sided markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 1-29, January.
    19. Adachi, Takanori & Tremblay, Mark J., 2020. "Business-to-business bargaining in two-sided markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    20. Jihwan Do, 2023. "Joint market dominance through exclusionary compatibility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1077-1110, December.
    21. Giovannetti, Emanuele & Siciliani, Paolo, 2023. "Platform Competition and Incumbency Advantage under Heterogeneous Lock-in effects," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    22. Yang Geng & Yulin Zhang & Jing Li, 2023. "Two-sided competition, platform services and online shopping market structure," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 138(2), pages 95-127, March.
    23. Gary Biglaiser & Jacques Crémer & André Veiga, 2022. "Should I stay or should I go? Migrating away from an incumbent platform," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(3), pages 453-483, September.
    24. Dawen Meng & Guoqiang Tian, 2021. "The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 337-375, July.
    25. Kevin J. Boudreau, 2021. "Promoting Platform Takeoff and Self-Fulfilling Expectations: Field Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5953-5967, September.

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