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Robust competitive auctions

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  • Han, Seungjin

Abstract

A competitive distribution of auctions (Peters 1997) is robust to the possibility of a seller’s deviation to any arbitrary mechanisms, let alone direct mechanisms because the sufficient condition for the robustness is embedded in its notion of equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Han, Seungjin, 2015. "Robust competitive auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 207-210.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:207-210
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.031
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Peters & Balázs Szentes, 2012. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 363-411, January.
    2. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
    3. ,, 2010. "Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(2), May.
    4. Takuro Yamashita, 2010. "Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 791-801, March.
    5. Dam Kaniska & Perez-Castrillo David, 2006. "The Principal-Agent Matching Market," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-34, August.
    6. Peter Norman, 2004. "Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(4), pages 1163-1188.
    7. Hellwig, Martin F., 2005. "A utilitarian approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 1981-2003, December.
    8. Michael Peters, 1997. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(1), pages 97-123.
    9. Black, Dan A & Hoyt, William H, 1989. "Bidding for Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1249-1256, December.
    10. Roman Inderst, 2001. "Screening in a Matching Market," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(4), pages 849-868.
    11. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
    12. Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-247, February.
    13. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    14. Birulin, Oleksii, 2006. "Public goods with congestion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 289-299, July.
    15. Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 2010. "Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1905-1938, November.
    16. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
    17. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
    18. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
    19. Coles, Melvyn G. & Eeckhout, Jan, 2003. "Indeterminacy and directed search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 265-276, August.
    20. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2018. "On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 1-15.
    2. Han Seungjin, 2016. "Sellers’ Implicit Collusion in Directed Search Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 711-738, June.
    3. Han, Seungjin, 2022. "General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    4. Seungjin Han, 2015. "Competing Mechanisms: Theory and Applications in Directed Search Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2015-07, McMaster University, revised May 2016.
    5. Lavi, Ron & Shamash, Elisheva S., 2022. "Principal-agent VCG contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    6. Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
    7. Ma, Gang & Zheng, Junjun & Wei, Ju & Wang, Shilei & Han, Yefan, 2021. "Robust optimization strategies for seller based on uncertainty sets in context of sequential auction," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 390(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competitive auctions; Robust equilibrium; Competing mechanism design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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