IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/restud/v68y2001i4p849-868..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Screening in a Matching Market

Author

Listed:
  • Roman Inderst

Abstract

Contract design under incomplete information is often analysed in a bilaterally monopolistic setting. If the informed party's reservation value does not depend on its private information (its type), it is a standard result that the uninformed side offers "low" types distorted contracts to reduce the information rent left to "high" types. We challenge this result by embedding contract design in a matching market environment. We consider a market where players meet pairwise and where, in each match, either side may be chosen to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. As frictions become sufficiently low, we find that the set of equilibria is independent of whether there is complete or incomplete information. In particular, all contracts are free of distortions.

Suggested Citation

  • Roman Inderst, 2001. "Screening in a Matching Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 849-868.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:4:p:849-868.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-937X.00192
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shneyerov, Artyom & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2010. "Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 748-762, March.
    2. Matthew J. Baker & Ingmar Nyman, 2017. "Job Hoarding," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 173(4), pages 688-722, December.
    3. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li, 2007. "Price discrimination and efficient matching," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 243-263, February.
    4. Shingo Ishiguro, 2010. "Holdup, search, and inefficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(2), pages 307-338, August.
    5. Stephan Lauermann, 2008. "When Less Information is Good for Efficiency: Private Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets," 2008 Meeting Papers 419, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Han, Seungjin, 2015. "Robust competitive auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 207-210.
    7. Inderst, Roman, 2005. "Matching markets with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 145-166, April.
    8. Silvia Sonderegger, 2004. "Nonlinear Pricing and Multimarket Duopolists," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 04/110, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    9. Inderst, Roman, 2004. "Contractual distortions in a market with frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 155-176, May.
    10. Matthew Baker & Ingmar Nyman, 2009. "Competitive Pressure and Lying in Search Markets," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 426, Hunter College Department of Economics.
    11. Lauermann, Stephan, 2012. "Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: An inversion result," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1969-1997.
    12. Hao Li, 2003. "Price Discrimination in Matching Markets," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000028, UCLA Department of Economics.
    13. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M, 2002. "Venture Capital Contracts and Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 3203, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Gallemore, Caleb & Jespersen, Kristjan, 2016. "Transnational Markets for Sustainable Development Governance: The Case of REDD+," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 79-94.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:68:y:2001:i:4:p:849-868.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.