Contractual distortions in a market with frictions
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- Stole, Lars A, 1995. "Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(4), pages 529-562, Winter.
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- Nicolas Curien & Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey, 1998. "Pricing Regulation Under Bypass Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 259-279, Summer.
- Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
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- Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1989. "Inflexible Rules in Incentive Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 69-84, March.
- Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
- Srinagesh, Padmanabhan & Bradburd, Ralph M, 1989. "Quality Distortion by a Discriminating Monopolist," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 96-105, March.
- Srinagesh, P. & Bradburd, R.M., 1988. "Quality Distorsion By A Discriminating Monopolist," Department of Economics Working Papers 117, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Roman Inderst, 2001. "Screening in a Matching Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 849-868.
- Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84.
- Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June.
- Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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