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A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms

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  • Peters, Michael
  • Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian

Abstract

We prove a folk theorem for games in which mechanism designers compete in mechanisms and in which there are at least 4 players. All allocations supportable by a centralized mechanism designer, including allocations involving correlated actions (and correlated punishments) can be supported as Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in the competing mechanism game.

Suggested Citation

  • Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010. "A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-17, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2010-17
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    File URL: http://montoya.econ.ubc.ca/mike/multiple_agency.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Peters & Balázs Szentes, 2012. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 363-411, January.
    2. Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Program equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 363-373, November.
    3. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
    4. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    5. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    6. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    7. Vida, Péter & Forges, Françoise, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    8. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-1385, November.
    9. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    10. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    11. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    12. Takuro Yamashita, 2010. "Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 791-801, March.
    13. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    14. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
    15. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    16. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
    17. Claudio Mezzetti, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1617-1626, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2018. "A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(2), pages 735-760.
    2. Han, Seungjin, 2015. "Robust competitive auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 207-210.
    3. Alessandro Pavan & Giacomo Calzolari, 2010. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 132-190, May.
    4. Han, Seungjin, 2014. "Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-95.
    5. Gorkem Celik & Michael Peters, 2016. "Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 374-411, February.
    6. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2015. "Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 1-15.
    7. Peters, Michael, 2010. "On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-18, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
    8. Han Seungjin, 2016. "Sellers’ Implicit Collusion in Directed Search Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 711-738, June.
    9. James Albrecht & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2014. "Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 3288-3296, October.
    10. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012. "Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
    11. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2014. "Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-36, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    12. Han, Seungjin, 2012. "On take it or leave it offers in common agency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 777-781.
    13. Koessler, Frédéric & Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 2013. "Committing to transparency to resist corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 117-126.
    14. Seungjin Han, 2015. "Competing Mechanisms: Theory and Applications in Directed Search Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2015-07, McMaster University, revised May 2016.
    15. Cristian Troncoso-Valverde, 2013. "Competing Auctions with Heterogeneous Goods," Working Papers 46, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    16. Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
    17. Michael Peters & Balázs Szentes, 2012. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 363-411, January.
    18. repec:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2015-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Peters, Michael, 2014. "Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2014-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
    20. Seungjin Han, 2018. "Neutralized Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018-11, McMaster University.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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