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A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms

  • Peters, Michael
  • Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian

We prove a folk theorem for games in which mechanism designers compete in mechanisms and in which there are at least 4 players. All allocations supportable by a centralized mechanism designer, including allocations involving correlated actions (and correlated punishments) can be supported as Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in the competing mechanism game.

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File URL: http://montoya.econ.ubc.ca/mike/multiple_agency.pdf
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Paper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Microeconomics.ca working papers with number michael_peters-2010-17.

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Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 13 May 2010
Date of revision: 19 Oct 2013
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2010-17
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.economics.ubc.ca/

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  1. Forges, Françoise & Vida, Péter, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
  2. Takuro Yamashita, 2010. "Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 791-801, 03.
  3. Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2004. "Program equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 363-373, November.
  4. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Les Cahiers de Recherche 926, HEC Paris.
  5. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.
  6. Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  7. Michael Peters & Balázs Szentes, 2012. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 363-411, 01.
  8. Claudio Mezzetti, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1617-1626, 09.
  9. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
  10. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  11. Kalai, Adam Tauman & Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2010. "A commitment folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 127-137, May.
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