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Mechanism Design and Communication Networks

  • Ludovic Renou

    ()

  • Tristan Tomala

This paper characterizes the class of communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive-compatible social choice function is (partially) implementable. Among others, in environments with either common and independent beliefs and private values or a bad outcome, we show that if the communication network is 2-connected, then any incentive-compatible social choice function is implementable. A network is 2-connected if each player is either directly connected to the designer or indirectly connected to the designer through at least two disjoint paths. We couple encryption techniques together with appropriate incentives to secure the transmission of each player’s private information to the designer.

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File URL: http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp08-35.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 08/35.

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Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:08/35
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Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000109, David K. Levine.
  3. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity Of Mixed Equilibria In Mechanisms: A Unified Approach To Exact And Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
  5. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Timothy Van Zandt, 2007. "Communication Complexity and Mechanism Design," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 543-553, 04-05.
  8. Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, 1994. "The Firm as a Communication Network," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 809-839.
  9. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 2004. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9599, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  11. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January.
  12. Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.
  13. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  14. Bernard Salanié, 2003. "The Economics of Taxation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262194864.
  15. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
  16. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
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