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Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents

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  • Takuro Yamashita

Abstract

We consider a class of mechanism games in which there are multiple principals and three or more agents. For a mechanism game in this class, a sort of folk theorem holds: there is a threshold value for each of the principals such that an allocation is achieved at a pure-strategy sequential equilibrium of the game if and only if (i) it is incentive compatible and (ii) it attains an expected utility for each principal that is greater than or equal to the threshold value for the principal. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Takuro Yamashita, 2010. "Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 791-801, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:2:p:791-801
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    Cited by:

    1. Han, Seungjin, 2015. "Robust competitive auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 207-210.
    2. Galperti, Simone, 2015. "Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 648-667.
    3. Han, Seungjin, 2014. "Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-95.
    4. Peters, Michael, 2010. "On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-18, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
    5. Han Seungjin, 2016. "Sellers’ Implicit Collusion in Directed Search Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 711-738, June.
    6. Arribas, I. & Urbano, A., 2017. "Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 14-38.
    7. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012. "Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
    8. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-049 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
    10. Seungjin Han, 2015. "Competing Mechanisms: Theory and Applications in Directed Search Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2015-07, McMaster University, revised May 2016.
    11. Ghosh, Sambuddha & Han, Seungjin, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2012-12, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 May 2013.
    12. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
    13. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2017. "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," TSE Working Papers 17-863, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    14. Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
    15. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
    16. Michael Peters & Balázs Szentes, 2012. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 363-411, January.
    17. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle," CEIS Research Paper 201, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 30 Jun 2011.
    18. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2017. "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 421, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 16 Dec 2017.
    19. repec:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2015-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Peters, Michael, 2014. "Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2014-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
    21. Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games," Working Papers 2014-49, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    22. Seungjin Han, 2018. "Neutralized Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018-11, McMaster University.

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