Takuro Yamashita

Personal Details

First Name:	Takuro
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Yamashita
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pya303
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	https://sites.google.com/site/tytytytytytyty001/

Affiliation

Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Toulouse, France
http://www.tse-fr.eu/
RePEc:edi:tsetofr (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Alex Smolin & Takuro Yamashita, 2022. "Information Design in Smooth Games," Papers 2202.10883, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.

   Cited by:

   1. Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023. "Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport," Papers 2311.02889, arXiv.org.
      • Anton Kolotilin & Roberto Corrao & Alexander Wolitzky, 2023. "Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport," Discussion Papers 2023-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
   2. Masaki Miyashita & Takashi Ui, 2023. "LQG Information Design," Papers 2312.09479, arXiv.org.

2. Yamashita, Takuro & Sarkisian, Roberto, 2021. "Large mechanism design with moment-based allocation externality," TSE Working Papers 21-1241, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

   Cited by:

   1. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "A Case for Tiered School Systems," Working Papers 202205, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
   2. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Sorting and Grading," Papers 2208.10894, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.

3. Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi, 2021. "A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality," TSE Working Papers 21-1244, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   • Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality," OSIPP Discussion Paper 20E002, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.

   Cited by:

   1. Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi, 2021. "Optimal Trade Mechanism with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," TSE Working Papers 21-1245, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
      • Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2021. "Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," OSIPP Discussion Paper 21E006, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.

4. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers 21-1242, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

   Cited by:

   1. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
   2. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2022. "Sorting and Grading," Papers 2208.10894, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.

5. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2021. "Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," OSIPP Discussion Paper 21E006, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
   • Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi, 2021. "Optimal Trade Mechanism with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," TSE Working Papers 21-1245, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

   Cited by:

   1. Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality," OSIPP Discussion Paper 20E002, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
      • Yamashita, Takuro & Murooka, Takeshi, 2021. "A Note on Adverse Selection and Bounded Rationality," TSE Working Papers 21-1244, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

6. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2018. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," TSE Working Papers 18-938, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2021.
   • Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.
   • Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03863573, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2018. "Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models," Working Papers 1024, Barcelona School of Economics.
      • Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2022. "Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 1-28.
   2. Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2019. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2003-2035, November.
      • Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 6844, CESifo.
      • Tilman Borgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Papers 1812.00849, arXiv.org.
      • Tilman Borgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2148, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
   3. Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism," Papers 2105.05427, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
   4. Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro, 2021. "Auction Design with Heterogeneous Priors," TSE Working Papers 21-1260, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2023.
   5. Tilman Börgers, 2017. "(No) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms: a comment on Chung and Ely (2007)," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 21(2), pages 73-82, June.
   6. Satoshi Nakada & Shmuel Nitzan & Takashi Ui, 2022. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 038, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
   7. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.

7. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Optimal Public Information Disclosure by Mechanism Designer," TSE Working Papers 18-936, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

   Cited by:

   1. Bara Kim & Seung Han Yoo, 2022. "Grand Mechanism and Population Uncertainty," Discussion Paper Series 2204, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
   2. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "Type-contingent Information Disclosure," TSE Working Papers 21-1242, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

8. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information," TSE Working Papers 18-937, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

   Cited by:

   1. Daniil Larionov & Hien Pham & Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "First Best Implementation With Costly Information Acquisition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_377, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
      • Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2022. "First best implementation with costly information acquisition," ZEW Discussion Papers 22-064, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
      • Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
   2. Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2021. "Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1313-1360, May.

9. Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Revenue-capped efficient auctions," TSE Working Papers 18-940, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   • Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 1284-1320.
   • Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-capped efficient auctions," Post-Print hal-03049103, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Zhonghao Shui, 2023. "Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 925-951, September.
      • Zhonghao Shui, 2019. "Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility," KIER Working Papers 1008, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
   2. Sebastián D. Bauer, 2023. "Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 555-567, June.
   3. Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 75-84.

10. Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2016. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," TSE Working Papers 16-677, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2017. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.

    Cited by:

    1. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
       • Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2020. "A Dominant Strategy, Double Clock Auction with Estimation-Based Tatonnement," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1249, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    2. Suehyun Kwon, 2018. "Selling Complementary Goods: Information and Products," CESifo Working Paper Series 7394, CESifo.
    3. Song, Yangwei, 2023. "Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 56-87.
    4. Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim, 2017. "Modularity and greed in double auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83199, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Hashimoto, Tadashi, 2018. "The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 708-733.
    6. Kiho Yoon, 2021. "Robust double auction mechanisms," Papers 2102.00669, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    7. Matthias Lang, 2020. "Mechanism Design with Narratives," CESifo Working Paper Series 8502, CESifo.
    8. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2023. "Optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    9. Jinpeng Ma & Qiongling Li, 2016. "Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, December.
    10. Margaretha Gansterer & Richard F. Hartl, 2018. "Centralized bundle generation in auction-based collaborative transportation," OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research e.V., vol. 40(3), pages 613-635, July.
    11. Pavlo Prokopovych & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 2022. "On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(2), pages 625-654, April.
    12. Nejat Anbarci & Jaideep Roy, 2018. "Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 1-9, January.
    13. Song, Yangwei, 2022. "Approximate Bayesian Implementation and Exact Maxmin Implementation: An Equivalence," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 362, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.

11. MORIYA, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利 & YAMASHITA, Takuro & 山下, 拓朗, 2015. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-18, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 173-186, January.
    • Moriya, Fumitoshi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," TSE Working Papers 18-941, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," Working Papers hal-01933896, HAL.
       • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Interactive Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01791918, HAL.
       • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Interactive Information Design," Post-Print halshs-01791918, HAL.
       • Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
       • Tomala, Tristan & Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," HEC Research Papers Series 1260, HEC Paris, revised 02 May 2018.
    2. Li, Fei & Song, Yangbo & Zhao, Mofei, 2023. "Global manipulation by local obfuscation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    3. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 173-186, January.
       • MORIYA, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利 & YAMASHITA, Takuro & 山下, 拓朗, 2015. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-18, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
       • Moriya, Fumitoshi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," TSE Working Papers 18-941, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid & Denis Shishkin, 2024. "Perfect Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2402.06765, arXiv.org.
    5. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2023. "Persuasion and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 18104, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Laura Doval & Alex Smolin, 2021. "Persuasion and Welfare," Papers 2109.03061, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    6. Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 16543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Smolin, Alex & Doval, Laura, 2021. "Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective," TSE Working Papers 21-1247, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. Hiroto Sato, 2023. "Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 269-285, June.

12. Yamashita, Takuro, 2014. "Strategic and structural uncertainties in robust implementation," TSE Working Papers 14-514, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.

13. Yamashita, Takuro, 2014. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies, with Applications to Auctions and Bilateral Trade," TSE Working Papers 14-513, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Borgers, Tilman & Smith, Doug, 2011. "Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules," MPRA Paper 37027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • , & Smith, Doug, 2014. "Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    2. Gabriel Carroll, 2015. "Robustness and Linear Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 536-563, February.

Articles

1. Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 18(3), pages 1284-1320.
   • Nozomu Muto & Yasuhiro Shirata & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Revenue-capped efficient auctions," Post-Print hal-03049103, HAL.
   • Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Revenue-capped efficient auctions," TSE Working Papers 18-940, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   See citations under working paper version above.
2. Fumitoshi Moriya & Takuro Yamashita, 2020. "Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 173-186, January.
   • MORIYA, Fumitoshi & 森谷, 文利 & YAMASHITA, Takuro & 山下, 拓朗, 2015. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-18, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
   • Moriya, Fumitoshi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," TSE Working Papers 18-941, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   See citations under working paper version above.
3. Miura, Shintaro & Yamashita, Takuro, 2020. "Maximal miscommunication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).

   Cited by:

   1. Makoto Shimoji, 2022. "Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 451-481, November.

4. Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2017. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
   • Kojima, Fuhito & Yamashita, Takuro, 2016. "Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency," TSE Working Papers 16-677, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   See citations under working paper version above.
5. Takuro Yamashita, 2015. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(3), pages 1223-1246.

   Cited by:

   1. Mukherjee, Saptarshi, 2018. "Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: Some results on compromise alternatives," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 384-391.
   2. Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2018. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," TSE Working Papers 18-938, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2021.
      • Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 494-514, November.
      • Takuro Yamashita & Shuguang Zhu, 2022. "On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms," Post-Print hal-03863573, HAL.
   3. Jiangtao Li & Piotr Dworczak, 2020. "Are simple mechanisms optimal when agents are unsophisticated?," GRAPE Working Papers 42, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics.
   4. Mariann Ollar & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions," Working Papers 1126, Barcelona School of Economics.
      • Mariann Ollár & Antonio Penta, 2019. "Implementation via transfers with identical but unknown distributions," Economics Working Papers 1676, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
   5. Kazumura, Tomoya & Mishra, Debasis & Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2020. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
      • Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," Discussion Papers 17-04, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
      • Tomoya Kazumura & Debasis Mishra & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2017. "Mechanism design without quasilinearity," ISER Discussion Paper 1005, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
   6. Chen, Yi-Chun & Li, Jiangtao, 2018. "Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 294-317.
   7. Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2021. "Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1313-1360, May.
   8. Tianjiao Dai & Juuso Toikka, 2022. "Robust Incentives for Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1583-1613, July.
   9. Satoshi Nakada & Shmuel Nitzan & Takashi Ui, 2022. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 038, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
   10. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
   11. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve, 2017. "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 613-631.
       • MUKHERJEE Saptarshi & MUTO Nozomu & RAMAEKERS Eve, 2017. "Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2017011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
   12. Hagen, Martin & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2021. "Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
   13. NAKADA, Satoshi & NITZAN, Shmuel & UI, Takashi & 宇井, 貴志, 2017. "Robust Voting under Uncertainty," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-60, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
   14. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Ramaekers, Eve & Sen, Arunava, 2019. "Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: The Pareto correspondence and a generalization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 229-243.
   15. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Information-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2205.04137, arXiv.org.

6. Takuro Yamashita, 2010. "Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 791-801, March.

   Cited by:

   1. Jens Leth Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2022. "Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 6024-6038, August.
      • Jens Leth, Hougaard & Juan D., Moreno-Ternero & Lars Peter, Østerdal, 2018. "Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies," Working Papers 11-2018, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
      • Jens L. Hougaard & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero & Lars P. Osterdal, 2021. "Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies," Working Papers 21.15, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
   2. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2015. "On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition," Working Papers 2015-632, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
      • Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2015. "On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition," TSE Working Papers 15-609, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
      • Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2018. "On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 1-15.
      • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2018. "On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition," Post-Print hal-01897713, HAL.
      • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2018. "On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition," CEIS Research Paper 441, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 09 Aug 2018.
   3. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010. "A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-17, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Oct 2013.
      • Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
   4. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," TSE Working Papers 19-1021, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
      • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2017. "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 421, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 16 Dec 2017.
      • Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2017. "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," TSE Working Papers 17-863, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
      • Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 258-283.
   5. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," TSE Working Papers 21-1227, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2023.
      • Mariotti, Thomas & Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 16807, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2023. "Keeping the agents in the dark : private disclosures in competing mechanisms," Working Papers hal-03266804, HAL.
      • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Alessandro Pavan, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," CEIS Research Paper 519, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 21 Oct 2021.
   6. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples," TSE Working Papers 19-1014, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2020.
      • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Gwenaël Piaser, 2021. "Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples," Post-Print hal-03106896, HAL.
      • Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2021. "Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 79-93.
      • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Gwenael Piaser, 2019. "Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples," CEIS Research Paper 460, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 06 Jun 2019.
   7. Han, Seungjin, 2015. "Robust competitive auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 207-210.
      • Seungjin Han, 2014. "Robust Competitive Auctions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2014-04, McMaster University, revised Oct 2014.
   8. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle," CEIS Research Paper 201, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 30 Jun 2011.
   9. Seungjin Han, 2019. "General Competing Mechanisms with Frictions," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-09, McMaster University.
   10. Michael Peters & Balázs Szentes, 2012. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 363-411, January.
       • Peters, Michael & Szentes, Balazs, 2009. "Definable and Contractible Contracts," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2009-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 13 May 2010.
   11. Seungjin Han, 2018. "Neutralized Competition," Department of Economics Working Papers 2018-11, McMaster University.
   12. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2021. "Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection," TSE Working Papers 21-1201, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Aug 2022.
       • Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022. "Competitive nonlinear pricing under adverse selection," Working Papers hal-03629592, HAL.
   13. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2023. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Papers 2309.11595, arXiv.org.
   14. Arribas, I. & Urbano, A., 2017. "Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 14-38.
       • Iván Arribas & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 2014. "Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0614, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
   15. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012. "Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
       • Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2011. "Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness," CEIS Research Paper 196, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 10 Jun 2011.
   16. Seungjin Han, 2015. "Competing Mechanisms: Theory and Applications in Directed Search Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2015-07, McMaster University, revised May 2016.
   17. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
   18. Han, Seungjin, 2014. "Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-95.
       • Han, Seungjin, 2011. "Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2011-10, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 Apr 2013.
       • Seungjin Han, 2012. "Implicit Collusion in Non-Exclusive Contracting under Adverse Selection," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-15, McMaster University, revised Apr 2013.
   19. Peters, Michael, 2015. "Reciprocal contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 102-126.
   20. Peters, Michael, 2014. "Competing Mechanisms," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2014-7, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
   21. Seungjin Han, 2014. "Sellers' Implicit Collusion in Directed Search Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2014-05, McMaster University, revised May 2016.
       • Han Seungjin, 2016. "Sellers’ Implicit Collusion in Directed Search Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 711-738, June.
   22. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2021. "A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Analysis in Competing Mechanism Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2021-09, McMaster University.
   23. Peters, Michael, 2010. "On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games," Microeconomics.ca working papers michael_peters-2010-18, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 19 Feb 2014.
   24. Seungjin Han, 2021. "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2021-07, McMaster University.
       • Seungjin Han, 2021. "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Papers 2109.13177, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
   25. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-05, McMaster University.
   26. Michael Peters, 2014. "Competing mechanisms," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(2), pages 373-397, May.
   27. Galperti, Simone, 2015. "Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 648-667.
       • Simone Galperti, 2011. "Common Agency with Informed Principals: Menus and Signals," Discussion Papers 1541, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   28. Li, Anqi & Xing, Yiqing, 2020. "Intermediated implementation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
   29. Sambuddha Ghosh & Seungjin Han, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-03, McMaster University, revised May 2013.
       • Ghosh, Sambuddha & Han, Seungjin, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Microeconomics.ca working papers seungjin_han-2012-12, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 02 May 2013.
   30. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
   31. Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games," Working Papers 2014-49, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 21 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (19) 2014-08-16 2014-08-20 2016-01-03 2016-07-30 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2020-03-16 2021-09-13 2021-09-20 2021-09-20 2021-12-06 2021-12-06 2022-03-28 2022-04-11. Author is listed
2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (12) 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2020-03-16 2021-09-06 2021-09-06 2021-09-13 2021-12-06 2021-12-06 2022-03-28 2022-04-11. Author is listed
3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (8) 2014-08-16 2014-08-20 2016-01-03 2021-09-13 2021-09-20 2021-09-20 2022-03-28 2022-04-11. Author is listed
4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (7) 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2018-08-27 2021-12-06 2022-03-28 2022-04-11. Author is listed
5. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (5) 2021-09-06 2021-09-06 2021-09-13 2021-09-20 2021-09-20. Author is listed
6. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2016-07-30 2022-03-28
7. NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (2) 2014-08-20 2016-07-30
8. NEP-CWA: Central and Western Asia (2) 2021-09-13 2021-09-20
9. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (2) 2020-03-16 2021-09-20
10. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2022-04-11
11. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (1) 2020-03-16
12. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2020-03-16
13. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2022-04-11

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