IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2205.04137.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Information-Robust Optimal Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Wanchang Zhang

Abstract

A single unit of a good is sold to one of two bidders. Each bidder has either a high prior valuation or a low prior valuation for the good. Their prior valuations are independently and identically distributed. Each bidder may observe an independently and identically distributed signal about her prior valuation. The seller knows the distribution of the prior valuation profile and knows that signals are independently and identically distributed, but does not know the signal distribution. In addition, the seller knows that bidders play undominated strategies. I find that a second-price auction with a random reserve maximizes the worst-case expected revenue over all possible signal distributions and all equilibria in undominated strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Information-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2205.04137, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2205.04137
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.04137
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2019. "Information Design: A Unified Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(1), pages 44-95, March.
    2. Emir Kamenica, 2019. "Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 249-272, August.
    3. Anne-Katrin Roesler & Balázs Szentes, 2017. "Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 2072-2080, July.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    5. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 479-501, March.
    6. Alex Suzdaltsev, 2020. "Distributionally Robust Pricing in Independent Private Value Auctions," Papers 2008.01618, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
    7. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiangqian Yang, 2020. "Information Design in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2010.08990, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Karl H. Schlag, 2012. "Pricing Without Priors," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 12, pages 405-415, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Robust Private Supply of a Public Good," Papers 2201.00923, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    10. Condorelli, Daniele & Szentes, Balázs, 2020. "Information design in the holdup problem," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 90620, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Carrasco, Vinicius & Farinha Luz, Vitor & Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias & Monteiro, Paulo & Moreira, Humberto, 2018. "Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 245-279.
    12. Gabriel Carroll, 2017. "Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 453-488, March.
    13. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1821rrr is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    15. Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2021. "Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1313-1360, May.
    16. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-1257, November.
    17. Takuro Yamashita, 2015. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(3), pages 1223-1246.
    18. Daniele Condorelli & Balázs Szentes, 2020. "Information Design in the Holdup Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 681-709.
    19. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    20. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
    2. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    3. Schottmüller, Christoph, 2023. "Optimal information structures in bilateral trade," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    4. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
    5. Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2022. "Consumer Information and the Limits to Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 534-577, February.
    6. Yeon-Koo Che & Weijie Zhong, 2021. "Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods," Papers 2105.02828, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    7. Wanchang Zhang, 2021. "Correlation-Robust Optimal Auctions," Papers 2105.04697, arXiv.org, revised May 2022.
    8. Chen, Yi-Chun & Yang, Xiangqian, 2023. "Information design in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    9. Roesler, Anne-Katrin & Deb, Rahul, 2021. "Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness," CEPR Discussion Papers 16206, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Dirk Bergemann & Tibor Heumann & Stephen Morris, 2022. "Screening with Persuasion," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2338, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    11. Anja Prummer, "undated". "Discrimination in Promotion," Working Papers 905, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    12. Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2024. "The Best of Many Robustness Criteria in Decision Making: Formulation and Application to Robust Pricing," Papers 2403.12260, arXiv.org.
    13. Benjamin Brooks & Songzi Du, 2021. "Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1313-1360, May.
    14. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2065, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    15. Yang, Kai Hao, 2021. "Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    16. Pieter Kleer & Johan van Leeuwaarden, 2022. "Optimal Stopping Theory for a Distributionally Robust Seller," Papers 2206.02477, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    17. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2021. "Persuasion with Ambiguous Receiver Preferences," Papers 2109.11536, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    18. Yang Cai & Yingkai Li & Jinzhao Wu, 2024. "Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions," Papers 2403.08145, arXiv.org.
    19. Shixin Wang, 2023. "The Power of Simple Menus in Robust Selling Mechanisms," Papers 2310.17392, arXiv.org.
    20. Anja Prummer & Francesco Nava, 2023. "Value Design in Optimal Mechanisms," Economics working papers 2023-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2205.04137. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.