Pricing without Priors
We consider the problem of pricing a single object when the seller has only minimal information about the true valuation of the buyer. Specifically, the seller only knows the support of the possible valuations and has no further distributional information. The seller is solving this choice problem under uncertainty by minimizing her regret. The pricing policy hedges against uncertainty by randomizing over a range of prices. The support of the pricing policy is bounded away from zero. Buyers with low valuations cannot generate substantial regret and are priced out of the market. We generalize the pricing policy without priors to encompass many buyers and many qualities. (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.
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- Stoye, Jörg, 2011. "Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2226-2251.
- Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2012.
"Robust Monopoly Pricing,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 13, pages 417-441
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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- Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1527R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2007.
- Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2007. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000983, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2005. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1527R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2008.
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- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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