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Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness

Author

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  • Fedor Sandomirskiy
  • Ben Wincelberg

Abstract

We ask when a normal-form game yields a single equilibrium prediction, even if players can coordinate by delegating play to an intermediary such as a platform or a cartel. Delegation outcomes are modeled via coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) when the intermediary cannot punish deviators, and via the set of individually rational correlated profiles (IRCP) when it can. We characterize games in which the IRCP or the CCE is unique, uncovering a structural link between these solution concepts. Our analysis also provides new conditions for the uniqueness of classical correlated and Nash equilibria that do not rely on the existence of dominant strategies. The resulting equilibria are robust to players' information about the environment, payoff perturbations, pre-play communication, equilibrium selection, and learning dynamics. We apply these results to collusion-proof mechanism design.

Suggested Citation

  • Fedor Sandomirskiy & Ben Wincelberg, 2026. "Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness," Papers 2602.21470, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2602.21470
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2602.21470
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