IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

(Weak) Correlation and Sunspots in Duopoly


  • Indrajit Ray
  • Sonali Sen Gupta


For duopoly models, we consider the notion of weak correlation using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nashcentric devices involving a sunspot structure are simple symmetric weak correlated equilibria. Any small perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Indrajit Ray & Sonali Sen Gupta, 2011. "(Weak) Correlation and Sunspots in Duopoly," Discussion Papers 11-14, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  • Handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:11-14

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Forges, Francoise & Peck, James, 1995. "Correlated Equilibrium and Sunspot Equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 33-50, January.
    2. Yi, Sang-Seung, 1997. "On the existence of a unique correlated equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 235-239, July.
    3. Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April.
    4. Abraham Neyman, 1997. "Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(2), pages 223-227.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Duopoly; weak Correlation; Simple device; Sunspots;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bir:birmec:11-14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Colin Rowat). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.