(Weak) Correlation and Sunspots in Duopoly
For duopoly models, we consider the notion of weak correlation using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nashcentric devices involving a sunspot structure are simple symmetric weak correlated equilibria. Any small perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium.
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- Abraham Neyman, 1997. "Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 223-227.
- Forges, F., 1991.
"Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1991053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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