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Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games

Author

Listed:
  • Abraham Neyman

    (Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, Jerusalem 91904, Israel and Institute for Decision Sciences, SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794, USA)

Abstract

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Abraham Neyman, 1997. "Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(2), pages 223-227.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:223-227
    Note: Received: July 1995 Revised version: August 1995
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    2. Bracha, Anat & Brown, Donald J., 2012. "Affective decision making: A theory of optimism bias," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 67-80.
    3. D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2008. "A Class of Best-Response Potential Games," Working Papers 635, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    4. Anat Bracha & Donald J Brown, 2007. "Affective Decision Making: a Behavioral Theory of Choice," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001676, UCLA Department of Economics.
    5. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1283-1310, November.
    6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 6, pages 241-251, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Anat Bracha & Donald J. Brown, 2008. "Affective Decision Making and the Ellsberg Paradox," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1667, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Belief Free Incomplete Information Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    9. Indrajit Ray & Sonali Gupta, 2013. "Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 541-562, May.
    10. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2004. "Best response equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 260-287, November.
    11. Ianni, Antonella, 2000. "Learning correlated equilibria in potential games," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0012, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    12. Deb, Rahul, 2008. "Interdependent Preferences, Potential Games and Household Consumption," MPRA Paper 6818, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Michael Chwe, 2006. "Statistical Game Theory," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000004, UCLA Department of Economics.

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