Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games
Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium.
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Volume (Year): 26 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: July 1995 Revised version: August 1995|
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