Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions
I study collusion between two bidders in a general symmetric IPV repeated auction, without communication, side transfers, or public randomization. I construct a collusive scheme, endogenous bid rotation, that generates a payoff larger than the bid rotation payoff.
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- Masaki Aoyagi, 2002.
"Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0566, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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99-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Owen R. Phillips & Dale J. Menkhaus & Kalyn T. Coatney, 2003. "Collusive Practices in Repeated English Auctions: Experimental Evidence on Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 965-979, June.
- Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September.
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