First-best collusion without communication
I study a 2-bidder infinitely repeated IPV first-price auction without transfers, communication, or public randomization, where each bidderʼs valuation can assume, in each of the (statistically independent) stage games, one of three possible values. Under certain distributional assumptions, the following holds: for every ϵ>0 there is a nondegenerate interval Δ(ϵ)⊂(0,1), such that if the biddersʼ discount factor belongs to Δ(ϵ), then there exists a Perfect Public Equilibrium with payoffs ϵ-close to the first-best payoffs.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Athey, Susan & Bagwell, Kyle, 2001.
"Optimal Collusion with Private Information,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 428-465, Autumn.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," Working papers 99-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, May.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000334, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2007. "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000898, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, 2013. "Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(4), pages 1714-1725.
- Rachmilevitch, Shiran, "undated". "Endogenous Bid Rotation in Repeated Auctions," Working Papers WP2011/9, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
- Birgit Heydenreich & Rudolf Müller & Marc Uetz & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2009. "Characterization of Revenue Equivalence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 307-316, January.
- First:Birgit Heydenreich & Rudolf Muller & Marc Uetz & Rakesh Vohra, 2007. "Characterization of Revenue Equivalence," Discussion Papers 1448, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Heydenreich Birgit & MÃ¼ller Rudolf & Uetz Marc & Vohra Rakesh, 2008. "Characterization of Revenue Equivalence," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- MÃ¼ller Rudolf & Uetz Marc & Vohra Rakesh & Heydenreich Birgit, 2007. "Characterization of Revenue Equivalence," Research Memorandum 017, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
- Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006. "Private monitoring in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
- Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Private Monitoring in Auctions," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-599, June.
- Johannes Hörner & Julian Jamison, 2007. "Collusion with (almost) no information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(3), pages 804-822, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:224-230. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.