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Persuasion without ex-post commitment

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  • Kreutzkamp, Sophie
  • Lou, Yichuan

Abstract

We study a persuasion model with limited commitment in which the sender can commit to a signal ex ante but not to truthful reporting ex post. Sender-optimal signals exploit a key trade-off: although better-quality information allows the sender to communicate more precisely, it adversely affects the credibility of his messages. Building on this observation, we provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the sender to strictly benefit from obtaining an imperfect signal. Under linear preferences, we show that sender-optimal signals can take on a bi-pooling structure; if preferences are also convex, bi-pooling becomes necessary. Finally, we provide a full characterization of sender-optimal signals for the popular uniform-quadratic specification, which we use to quantify and compare the value of commitments.

Suggested Citation

  • Kreutzkamp, Sophie & Lou, Yichuan, 2025. "Persuasion without ex-post commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 228(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:228:y:2025:i:c:s0022053125001048
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106058
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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