IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Robust Voting under Uncertainty

Listed author(s):
  • NAKADA, Satoshi
  • NITZAN, Shmuel
  • UI, Takashi
Registered author(s):

    This paper proposes normative consequentialist criteria for voting rules under Knightian uncertainty about individual preferences to characterize a weighted majority rule (WMR). The criteria stress the significance of responsiveness, i.e., the probability that the social outcome coincides with the realized individual preferences. A voting rule is said to be robust if, for any probability distribution of preferences, responsiveness of at least one individual is greater than one-half. Our main result establishes that a voting rule is robust if and only if it is a WMR without ties. This characterization of a WMR avoiding the worst possible outcomes complements the well-known characterization of a WMR achieving the optimal outcomes, i.e., efficiency regarding responsiveness.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/28978/1/070_hiasDP-E-60.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion paper series with number HIAS-E-60.

    as
    in new window

    Length: 22 p.
    Date of creation: Dec 2017
    Handle: RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-60
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    Faculty Building II, 2-1, Naka, Kunitachi, 186 - 8601

    Phone: (+81) 42 – 580 - 8604
    Fax: (+81) 42 – 580 - 8605
    Web page: http://hias.ad.hit-u.ac.jp/
    Email:


    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as
    in new window


    1. Kim-Sau Chung & J.C. Ely, 2007. "Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 447-476.
    2. Yaron Azrieli & Semin Kim, 2014. "Pareto Efficiency And Weighted Majority Rules," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 1067-1088, November.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
    4. repec:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i::p:453-488 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Dirk Bergemann & Karl Schlag, 2012. "Robust Monopoly Pricing," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 13, pages 417-441 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
    7. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309-309.
    8. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2065, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    9. Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1981. "The characterization of decisive weighted majority rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 119-124.
    10. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 651-665.
    11. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2008. "On The Robustness of Majority Rule," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 949-973, September.
    12. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    13. Fishburn, Peter C. & Gehrlein, William V., 1977. "Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 72-91, June.
    14. Mandler, Michael, 2005. "Harsanyi's utilitarianism via linear programming," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 85-90, July.
    15. Gabriel Carroll, 2015. "Robustness and Linear Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 536-563, February.
    16. repec:cup:apsrev:v:63:y:1969:i:01:p:40-56_26 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Einy, Ezra & Lehrer, Ehud, 1989. "Regular Simple Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(2), pages 195-207.
    18. Takuro Yamashita, 2015. "Implementation in Weakly Undominated Strategies: Optimality of Second-Price Auction and Posted-Price Mechanism," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 82(3), pages 1223-1246.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Digital Resources Section, Hitotsubashi University Library)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.