Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples
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- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Thomas Mariotti & Gwenael Piaser, 2019. "Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples," CEIS Research Paper 460, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 06 Jun 2019.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Private communication in competing mechanism games,"
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- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2017. "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 421, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 16 Dec 2017.
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Cited by:
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019.
"Private communication in competing mechanism games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 258-283.
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2017. "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," TSE Working Papers 17-863, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," TSE Working Papers 19-1021, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser, 2017. "On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 421, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 16 Dec 2017.
- Seungjin Han, 2020. "Quasi Ex-Post Equilibrium in Competing Mechanisms," Department of Economics Working Papers 2020-11, McMaster University.
- Alberto Bucci & Lorenzo Carbonari & Monia Ranalli & Giovanni Trovato, 2019. "Health and Development," CEIS Research Paper 470, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 30 Sep 2019.
More about this item
Keywords
Competing Mechanisms; Folk Theorems; Exclusive Competition.;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2019-06-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
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