Report NEP-DES-2024-09-23
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Aram Grigoryan & Markus Moller, 2024, "Robust Market Design with Opaque Announcements," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2408.04509, Aug.
- Andrea Canidio & Felix Henneke, 2024, "Fair Combinatorial Auction for Blockchain Trade Intents: Being Fair without Knowing What is Fair," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2408.12225, Aug, revised Oct 2025.
- Moise Blanchard & Patrick Jaillet, 2024, "Near-Optimal Mechanisms for Resource Allocation Without Monetary Transfers," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2408.10066, Aug.
- Fabian R. Pieroth & Tuomas Sandholm, 2024, "Verifying Approximate Equilibrium in Auctions," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2408.11445, Aug.
- David P. Brown & Derek E. H. Olmstead & Blake Shaffer, 2024, "Electricity Market Design with Increasing Renewable Generation: Lessons From Alberta," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2024-03, Aug.
- Megan Bailey & David P. Brown & Erica Myers & Blake Shaffer & Frank A. Wolak, 2024, "Electric Vehicles and the Energy Transition: Unintended Consequences of a Common Retail Rate Design," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2024-04, Sep.
- Bianchi, Milo & Yamashita, Takuro, 2024, "Optimal Investment in Network Infrastructures," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 1560, Aug.
- Natalie Kessler & Iman van Lelyveld & Ellen van der Woerd, 2024, "Exclusive Portfolio Dealing and Market Inefficiency," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 24-019/IV, Mar.
- Raphael Boleslavsky & Aaron Kolb, 2024, "The Design and Price of Influence," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2408.03689, Aug, revised Feb 2025.
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