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Information Provision in Competing Auctions

Author

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  • Cristián Troncoso Valverde

    (Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales)

Abstract

This paper studies the incentives faced by competing auctioneers who can provide information to prospective bidders about their valuations of the objects for sale. We consider a model in which two sellers running second-price auctions compete to attract potential bidders by releasing information about valuations before bidders select trading partners. Thus, bidders' participation decisions are modeled in ex-post terms which allows us to investigate the effect of information on the composition of the set of types who visit each seller. We derive a set of necessary and su#cient conditions that supports full information provision as the unique equilibrium of the game. This result holds even if the number of bidders is restricted to two, which contrasts with the ndings of models with a single auctioneer where full information provision is never optimal. We also provide a characterization of information in terms of its strategic value to the sellers.

Suggested Citation

  • Cristián Troncoso Valverde, 2011. "Information Provision in Competing Auctions," Working Papers 25, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    • Handle: RePEc:ptl:wpaper:25
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Wataru Tamura, 2013. "Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle," CARF F-Series CARF-F-330, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    2. Todd R. Kaplan & David Wettstein, 2022. "Two-stage contests with preferences over style," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1141-1161, November.
    3. Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2013. "Competing through information provision," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 438-451.
    4. Landi, Massimiliano & Menicucci, Domenico & Sarychev, Andrey, 2023. "Competing auctions with non-identical objects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    5. Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Prices versus auctions in large markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1297-1337, November.
    6. Wataru Tamura, 2016. "Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(2), pages 201-225, June.
    7. Gino Loyola, 2021. "Effects of competition in first-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1527-1567, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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