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Report NEP-DES-2021-05-03
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Bos, Olivier & Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Truyts, Tom, 2021, "Signalling in auctions: Experimental evidence," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 21-037.
- Oleg Muratov, 2021, "All-Pay Auctions with Reserve Price and Bid Cap," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft, number dp2106, Apr.
- Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2021, "Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion: The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9021.
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Seres, Gyula, 2019, "Are Strategies Anchored?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 211, Dec.
- Engelmann, Dirk & Frank, Jeff & Koch, Alexander K. & Valente, Marieta, 2020, "Second-Chance Offers and Buyer Reputation: Theory and Evidence on Auctions with Default," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 237, Apr.
- Meisner, Vincent & von Wangenheim, Jonas, 2019, "School Choice and Loss Aversion," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 208, Dec.
- Mariya Halushka, 2021, "Obviously Strategy-proof Mechanism Design With Rich Private Information," Working Papers, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics, number 2104E.
- Backhoff-Veraguas, Julio & Beissner, Patrick & Horst, Ulrich, 2020, "Robust Contracting in General Contract Spaces," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 242, May.
- König, Tobias & Kübler, Dorothea & Mechtenberg, Lydia & Schmacker, Renke, 2019, "Fair Procedures with Naive Agents: Who Wants the Boston Mechanism?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 222, Dec.
- Mithun Chakraborty & Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin & Warut Suksompong, 2021, "Picking Sequences and Monotonicity in Weighted Fair Division," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2104.14347, Apr, revised Aug 2021.
- Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2020, "Public Good Overprovision by a Manipulative Provider," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 251, Jul.