Wars of Attrition with Stochastic Competition
We extend the all-pay auctions analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stochastic competition setting. In the war of attrition it does not directly follow from the first order condition that the bidding equilibrium strategy is a weighted average of the bidding equilibrium strategies that would be chosen for each number of bidders. This result contrasts with the characterization of the bidding equilibrium strategies in the first-price all-pay auction as well as the winner-pay auctions. Our findings are applicable to future works on contests and charity auctions.
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- Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Pekec & Ilia Tsetlin, 2005.
"Information Aggregation in Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders,"
0605, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
- Harstad, Ronald M. & Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa & Tsetlin, Ilia, 2008. "Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 476-508, March.
- Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
- Harstad, Ronald M. & Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1990. "Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 35-40, May.
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997.
"An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1994. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Game Theory and Information 9409002, EconWPA.
- McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October.
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