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On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry

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  • Chen, Bo
  • Jiang, Xiandeng
  • Knyazev, Dmitriy

Abstract

The contest entails one prize and n potential bidders. Each bidder receives a signal about the value of the prize and has a signal-dependent probability of participation. All bidders bear a cost of bidding that is an increasing function of their bids. It is shown that the contest organizer prefers fully concealing (disclosing) the information about the number of participating bidders when the cost functions are convex (concave). This result is applied to various cases with endogenous entry. However, it does not extend to the cases in which bidders have heterogeneous participation probabilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Bo & Jiang, Xiandeng & Knyazev, Dmitriy, 2017. "On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 66-73.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:66-73
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David Wettstein & Todd R. Kaplan, 2016. "Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style," Working Papers 1607, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    2. Chen, Bo, 2020. "Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    3. Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021. "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 33-64, June.
    4. Christian Ewerhart & Julia Lareida, 2018. "Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests," ECON - Working Papers 279, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jan 2021.
    5. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    6. Bo Chen & Marco Serena, 2020. "Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2020-08, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    7. Chen, Bo & Ma, Lijun & Zhu, Zhaobo & Zhou, Yu, 2020. "Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    8. Chen, Bo, 2019. "On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 60-65.

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