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Contest for power in organizations

  • Gregor, Martin

This paper explains the provision of private rent to powerful members in an organization as an outcome of a contest for power that raises the total contributions to the organization. A necessary condition for a socially efficient contest scheme with reimbursements is characterized.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 114 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 280-283

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:114:y:2012:i:3:p:280-283
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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  1. Bos, Olivier, 2011. "How lotteries outperform auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 262-264, March.
  2. Andreas Lange & John List & Michael Price, 2007. "Using lotteries to finance public goods: theory and experimental evidence," Artefactual Field Experiments 00381, The Field Experiments Website.
  3. Luca Corazzini & Marco Faravelli & Luca Stanca, 2007. "A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0714, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
  4. Subhasish Chowdhury & Roman Sheremeta, 2011. "A generalized Tullock contest," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 413-420, June.
  5. Marco Faravelli, 2008. "The Important Thing Is not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 0802, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
  6. Jeffrey Carpenter & Jessica Holmes & PeterHans Matthews, 2008. "Charity auctions: a field experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 92-113, 01.
  7. Michael A. Spencer & Stephen K. Swallow & Jason F. Shogren & John A. List, 2008. "Rebate Rules in Threshold Public Good Provision," NBER Working Papers 14559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Alexander Matros & Daniel Armanios, 2009. "Tullock’s contest with reimbursements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 49-63, October.
  9. Michael Baye & Dan Kovenock & Casper Vries, 2012. "Contests with rank-order spillovers," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 315-350, October.
  10. Olivier Bos, 2008. "Charity Auctions for the Happy Few," CESifo Working Paper Series 2398, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Arthur J.H.C. Schram & Sander Onderstal, 2009. "Bidding To Give: An Experimental Comparison Of Auctions For Charity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(2), pages 431-457, 05.
  12. Morgan, John, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 761-84, October.
  13. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1996. " Rent-Seeking Contest When the Prize Increases with Aggregate Efforts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 55-66, April.
  14. Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
  15. Elfenbein, Daniel W. & McManus, Brian, 2010. "Last-minute bidding in eBay charity auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 42-45, April.
  16. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2010. "Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 1-7, February.
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