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Last-minute bidding in eBay charity auctions

Author

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  • Elfenbein, Daniel W.
  • McManus, Brian

Abstract

Relative to typical eBay auctions, bidding in eBay charity auctions occurs earlier and also less frequently in the auctions' final seconds. This suggests that some charity bidders benefit from driving-up others' payments, as when auction revenue is a public good.

Suggested Citation

  • Elfenbein, Daniel W. & McManus, Brian, 2010. "Last-minute bidding in eBay charity auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 42-45, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:1:p:42-45
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeffrey C. Ely & Tanjim Hossain, 2009. "Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 68-94, August.
    2. Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
    3. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    4. Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006. "Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
    5. Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2005. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 890-907, Winter.
    6. Maxim Engers & Brian McManus, 2007. "Charity Auctions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(3), pages 953-994, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. März, Armin & Lachner, Michael & Heumann, Christian G. & Schumann, Jan H. & von Wangenheim, Florian, 2021. "How You Remind Me! The Influence of Mobile Push Notifications on Success Rates in Last-Minute Bidding," Journal of Interactive Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 11-24.
    2. Gregor, Martin, 2012. "Contest for power in organizations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 114(3), pages 280-283.
    3. Chien-Yu Lai & Andreas Lange & John A. List & Michael K. Price, 2017. "The Business of Business is Business: Why (Some) Firms Should Provide Public Goods when they Sell Private Goods," NBER Working Papers 23105, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Yan Chen & Peter Cramton & John A. List & Axel Ockenfels, 2021. "Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(9), pages 5317-5348, September.
    5. Ben Rhouma, Tarek & Zaccour, Georges, 2012. "An empirical investigation of late bidding in online auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 715-717.
    6. Nicola Dimitri, 2022. "Last minute only bidding is implausible in eBay sealed bid type-of-auctions," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 225-239, June.

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