Sniping in Proxy Auctions with Deadlines
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Sofia Moroni, 2015. "Existence of trembling hand equilibrium in revision games with imperfect information," Working Paper 5874, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
- Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 992, CESifo Group Munich.
- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2005.
"An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 890-907, Winter.
- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-47, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Roth, Alvin & Ockenfels, Axel & Ariely, Dan, 2005. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Scholarly Articles 2579649, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E Roth, 2003. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000433, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, February.
- Matthew Backus & Tom Blake & Dimitriy V. Masterov & Steven Tadelis, 2015. "Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets?," NBER Working Papers 20942, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006. "Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
- Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2003. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 987, CESifo Group Munich.
- Lovo , Stefano & Tomala , Tristan, 2015. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games," HEC Research Papers Series 1093, HEC Paris.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-MIC-2016-07-23 (Microeconomics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:5875. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/depghus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.