An empirical investigation of late bidding in online auctions
Why do some participants in online auctions place their bids right before the time of closing? Using e-Bay data, we propose count-data models to look at both the presence of the late-bidding phenomenon and its intensity. Our results reveal significant differences between extremely late-bidders (snipers) and moderately late-bidders.
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2579649, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-47, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Dan Ariely & Axel Ockenfels & Alvin E Roth, 2003. "An Experimental Analysis of Ending Rules in Internet Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000433, UCLA Department of Economics.
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"Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction,"
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992, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ockenfels, Axel & Roth, Alvin E., 2006. "Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 297-320, May.
- Elfenbein, Daniel W. & McManus, Brian, 2010. "Last-minute bidding in eBay charity auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 42-45, April.
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