Strategic Implications of Uncertainty Over One’s Own Private Value in Auctions
Suppose a bidder must decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating his own private value in an auction. This can explain why a bidder might increase his bid ceiling in the course of an auction, and why a bidder would like to know the private values of other bidders. It also can explain sniping — flurries of bids at the end of auctions with deadlines — as the result of other bidders trying to avoid stimulating the uninformed bidder to examine his value.
|Date of creation:||2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2006|
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