Auctions with options to re-auction
We examine a dynamic model of English auctions with independent private values. There is a single object for sale and it is not possible for the seller, who has a value of zero for the object, to commit not to sell in the future if a sale is not accomplished today. The seller may be able to commit to a reserve price, or make a cheap-talk announcement of a reserve price and secretly bid for the object herself in order to re-auction it in a later round with a new set of bidders. Bidders are "short-lived" in the sense that at the end of each round all existing bidders vanish and new bidders start arriving. This framework allows us to obtain existing results for one shot-auctions as special cases. This framework also allows us to capture some of the features of thick internet auctions and to obtain some new insights on the role of commitment, on optimal length and on socially optimal reserve prices that are not apparent from a one-shot auction perspective.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 2 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1742-7355|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1742-7355|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
- Indranil Chakraborty & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2004. "Auctions with shill bidding," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 271-287, August.
- Robert H. Porter, 1992.
"The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions,"
NBER Working Papers
4185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Porter, Robert H, 1995. "The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 1-27, January.
- Robert H. Porter, 1992. "The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," Discussion Papers 1008, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
- R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1994.
"Sequentially Optimal Auctions,"
1104, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Chris Jones & Flavio Menezes & Francis Vella, 2004.
"Auction Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia,"
The Economic Record,
The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 80(250), pages 271-288, 09.
- Jones, C. & Menezes, F. & Vella, F., 1996. "Auctions Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia," Papers 303, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
- Levin, Dan & Smith, James L, 1994. "Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 585-99, June.
- Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1996. "Reserve Prices without Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 149-164, August.
- Horstmann, Ignatius J & LaCasse, Chantale, 1997.
"Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a Resale Option,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 663-84, September.
- Horstmann, I.J. & LaCasse, C., 1995. "Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a Re-Sale Option," Working Papers 9507e, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- Ruqu Wang, 1991.
"Auctions Versus Posted-Price Selling,"
812, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Harstad, Ronald M. & Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 1990. "Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 35-40, May.
- Graham, Daniel A. & Marshall, Robert C. & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1990. "Phantom bidding against heterogeneous bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 13-17, January.
- McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, October.
- Haile, Philip A., 2003. "Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 72-110, January.
- Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981.
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
- Vincent Daniel R., 1995. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 575-584, April.
- Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1979. "Uncertainty and the Bidding for Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 697-705, September.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet," NBER Working Papers 7729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lucking-Reiley, David, 2000. "Auctions on the Internet: What's Being Auctioned, and How?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 227-52, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:2:y:2006:i:1:p:17-39. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.