Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions
We extend the Coase conjecture to the case of a seller with a single object, who faces n potential buyers and holds a sequence of English auctions until the object is sold. In an independent-private-values environment in which buyers and sellers share the same discount factor, we show that the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium path of reserve prices obeys a Coasian logic. Moreover, the equilibrium reserve path lies below that for the model of repeated sealed-bid, second-price auctions studied by McAfee and Vincent (1997). Nevertheless, the open (English) and sealed-bid formats are shown to be revenue equivalent.
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Volume (Year): 38 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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- Simon Grant & Atsushi Kajii & Flavio Menezes & Matthew J. Ryan, 2006.
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- R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1994.
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1104, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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