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Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Cohorts

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  • Simon Board

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  • Simon Board, 2005. "Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Cohorts," 2005 Meeting Papers 847, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed005:847
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rust, John, 1985. "Stationary Equilibrium in a Market for Durable Assets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 783-805, July.
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and compliance strategies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 85-125, October.
    3. John Conlisk & Eitan Gerstner & Joel Sobel, 1984. "Cyclic Pricing by a Durable Goods Monopolist," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(3), pages 489-505.
    4. J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), 1999. "Handbook of Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    5. Michael Landsberger & Isaac Meilijson, 1985. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Sales Strategy under Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 424-430, Autumn.
    6. Sobel, Joel, 1991. "Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1455-1485, September.
    7. Alessandro Lizzeri & Igal Hendel, 1999. "Adverse Selection in Durable Goods Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1097-1115, December.
    8. Butz, David A, 1990. "Durable-Good Monopoly and Best-Price Provisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(5), pages 1062-1076, December.
    9. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
    10. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    11. Wang, Ruqu, 2001. "Optimal pricing strategy for durable-goods monopoly," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 789-804, May.
    12. David Levhari & Robert S. Pindyck, 1981. "The Pricing of Durable Exhaustible Resources," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 96(3), pages 365-377.
    13. Board, Simon, 2007. "Selling options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 324-340, September.
    14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and environmental innovation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 127-140, October.
    15. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-149, April.
    16. Biehl, Andrew R, 2001. "Durable-Goods Monopoly with Stochastic Values," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 565-577, Autumn.
    17. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Optimal Auction Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
    18. Conlisk, John, 1984. "A peculiar example of temporal price discrimination," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 121-126.
    19. Nancy L. Stokey, 1979. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(3), pages 355-371.
    20. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Durable Goods Pricing When Quality Matters," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(4), pages 489-510, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    mechanism design; pricing; optimal stopping;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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