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Optimal Selling Strategies:


  • John G. Riley


  • Richard Zeckhauser



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  • John G. Riley & Richard Zeckhauser, 1980. "Optimal Selling Strategies:," UCLA Economics Working Papers 180, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:180

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Rothschild, Michael, 1973. "Models of Market Organization with Imperfect Information: A Survey," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(6), pages 1283-1308, Nov.-Dec..
    2. Lippman, Steven A & McCall, John J, 1976. "The Economics of Job Search: A Survey," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 347-368, September.
    3. George J. Stigler, 1961. "The Economics of Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 213-213.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Kelly & Stephen LeRoy, 2007. "Liquidity and Liquidation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(3), pages 553-572, June.
    2. Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June.
    3. Gabriele Camera & Alain Delacroix, 2004. "Trade Mechanism Selection in Markets with Frictions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(4), pages 851-868, October.
    4. Tapan Biswas & Jolian Mchardy, 2012. "Asking Price And Price Discounts: The Strategy Of Selling An Asset Under Price Uncertainty," Review of Economic Analysis, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, vol. 4(1), pages 17-37, June.
    5. Volker Nocke & Martin Peitz, 2003. "Monopoly Pricing under Demand Uncertainty: Final Sales versus Introductory ffers," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    6. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1437, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Flávio Menezes & Matthew Ryan, 2009. "Coasian dynamics in repeated English auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 349-366, November.
    8. Miller, Nolan & Piankov, Nikita & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2001. "When to Haggle," Working Paper Series rwp01-025, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    9. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Nicolaas J. Vriend, 1996. "A model of market-making," Economics Working Papers 184, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    11. Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, 2005. "Conditioning Prices on Purchase History," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(3), pages 367-381, May.
    12. Roman Inderst, 2008. "Dynamic Bilateral Bargaining under Private Information with a Sequence of Potential Buyers," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 220-236, January.
    13. Koye Somefun, 2001. "Posted Offer versus Bargaining: An Example of how Institutions can Facilitate Learning," Computing in Economics and Finance 2001 79, Society for Computational Economics.

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