When to Haggle
A seller faces a buyer with unknown reservation value. We show that buyer risk aversion can make it in the seller's interest to haggle. That is, the seller should make an initial offer and then, if it is rejected, make a second offer with some probability strictly less than one. This is true regardless of whether the seller haggles over price, quality, or price and quality simultaneously. The results are extended to contexts with multiple types of buyers and multiple dimensions for haggling.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/research/working_papers/index.htm
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Sherwin Rosen & Andy Rosenfield, 1995.
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
120, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Spence, Michael, 1977. "Nonlinear prices and welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 1-18, August.
- John G. Riley & Richard Zeckhauser, 1980. "Optimal Selling Strategies:," UCLA Economics Working Papers 180, UCLA Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp01-025. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.