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Intérêt public, intérêt privé et discrimination


  • Henriet, Dominique

    (CNET, Issy-les-Moulineaux, France)

  • Henry, Claude

    (Laboratoire d’économétrie de l’École polytechnique, Paris)

  • Rey, Patrick

    (INSEE, Paris)

  • Rochet, Jean-Charles

    (Laboratoire d’économétrie de l’École polytechnique, Paris)


We consider a service whose quality is variable and from which every consumer consumes either one unit or nothing. Production costs, both fixed and variable, do not depend on quality: a higher quality service is no more costly to produce than a lower quality one. On the consumption side however, higher quality is preferred: a consumer's willingness-to-pay for one unit of the service is an increasing and linear function of the service quality. Nous considérons un service à qualité variable dont chaque usager consomme au plus une unité. Les coûts de production, fixe et variable, ne dépendent pas de la qualité : améliorer, dans certaines limites, la qualité, n’augmente pas les coûts de production. Chaque usager cependant apprécie d’autant plus le service que celui-ci est de meilleure qualité : la propension à payer de l’usager est une fonction linéaire croissante de la qualité du service.

Suggested Citation

  • Henriet, Dominique & Henry, Claude & Rey, Patrick & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "Intérêt public, intérêt privé et discrimination," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 63(2), pages 98-117, juin et s.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:63:y:1987:i:2:p:98-117

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    2. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    3. Miller, Nolan & Piankov, Nikita & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2001. "When to Haggle," Working Paper Series rwp01-025, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    4. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    5. M. Barry Goldman & Hayne E. Leland & David S. Sibley, 1984. "Optimal Nonuniform Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 305-319.
    6. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    7. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Charles Hourcade & Michel Colombier, 1989. "Développement des réseaux et modulations spatio-temporelles des tarifs : l'équité territoriale revisitée," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(4), pages 649-678.
    2. Dominique Bureau, 1999. "Intérêt social et discrimination en assurance-maladie publique," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 14(2), pages 163-187.

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