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Trade Mechanism Selection in Markets with Frictions

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  • Camera, Gabriele
  • Delacroix, Alain

Abstract

We endogenize the trade mechanism in a search economy with many homogenous sellers and many heterogeneous buyers of unobservable type. We study how heterogeneity and the traders’ continuation values which are endogenous influence the sellers’ choice of trade mechanism. Sellers trade off the probability of an immediate sale against the surplus expected from it, choosing whether to trade with everyone and how quickly. In equilibrium sellers may simply target one buyer type via non-negotiable offers (price posting), or may price discriminate (haggling). We also study when haggling generates trading delays. A price setting externality arises because of a strategic complementarity in the sellers’ pricing choices.

Suggested Citation

  • Camera, Gabriele & Delacroix, Alain, 2003. "Trade Mechanism Selection in Markets with Frictions," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1166, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1166
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 2002. "Prices, Delay, and the Dynamics of Trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 304-339, June.
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    13. Gabriele Camera & Alain Delacroix, 2004. "Trade Mechanism Selection in Markets with Frictions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(4), pages 851-868, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Doniger, Cynthia L., 2015. "Wage Dispersion with Heterogeneous Wage Contracts," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-23, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
    2. Leo Kaas & Carlos Carrillo-Tudela, 2011. "Wage Dispersion and Labor Turnover with Adverse Selection," 2011 Meeting Papers 1075, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos & Kaas, Leo, 2015. "Worker mobility in a search model with adverse selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 340-386.
    4. Ennis, Huberto M., 2008. "Search, money, and inflation under private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 138(1), pages 101-131, January.
    5. Sandro Shelegia & Joshua Sherman, 2018. "Bargaining at Retail Stores: Evidence from Vienna," Economics Working Papers 1606, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    6. Gill, David & Thanassoulis, John, 2009. "The impact of bargaining on markets with price takers: Too many bargainers spoil the broth," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(6), pages 658-674, August.
    7. Hermann Gartner & Christian Holzner, 2015. "Wage Posting as a Positive Selection Device: Theory and Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 5494, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Gabriele Camera & Alain Delacroix, 2004. "Trade Mechanism Selection in Markets with Frictions," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(4), pages 851-868, October.
    9. Jacquet, Nicolas L. & Tan, Serene, 2012. "Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1064-1104.
    10. Xianwen Shi & Aloysius Siow, 2011. "Search Intermediaries," Working Papers tecipa-426, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    11. Xianwen Shi & Aloysius Siow, 2014. "Information externalities and intermediaries in frictional search markets," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1131-1152, November.
    12. Sandro Shelegia & Joshua Sherman, 2018. "Bargaining at Retail Stores: Evidence from Vienna," Working Papers 1032, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    13. Masui, Makoto, 2011. "Jobs with different wage determination mechanisms, social efficiency and unemployment," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 56-75, March.
    14. Anbarci, Nejat & Gomis-Porqueras, Pedro & Marcus, Pivato, 2012. "Formal and informal markets: A strategic and evolutionary perspective," MPRA Paper 42513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. David Gill & John Thanassoulis, 2007. "Too Many Bargainers Spoil The Broth: The Impact of Bargaining on Markets with Price Takers," Economics Series Working Papers 329, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Search ; Prices ; Negotiations ; Asymmetric Information;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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