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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bar-Isaac, Heski & Gavazza, Alessandro, 2015.
"Brokers’ contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market,"
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Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 73-82.
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- Bar-Isaac, Heski & Gavazza, Alessandro, 2015. "Brokers’ contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60731, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
More about this item
KeywordsSearch; Intermediation; Brokers; Housing Markets;
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2011-04-16 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-URE-2011-04-16 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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