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Brokers’ contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market

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  • Bar-Isaac, Heski
  • Gavazza, Alessandro

Abstract

We bring new evidence to bear on the role of intermediaries in frictional matching markets and on how parties design contracts with them. Specifically, we examine two features of contracts between landlords and agents in the Manhattan residential rental market. In our data, 72 percent of listings involve exclusive relationships between landlords and agents (the remaining 28 percent are non-exclusive); and in 21 percent of listings, the landlord commits to pay the agent’s fee (in the other 79 percent, the tenant pays the agent’s the fee). Our analysis highlights that these contractual features reflect landlords’ concerns about providing agents with incentives to exert effort specific to their rental units and to screen among heterogeneous tenants.

Suggested Citation

  • Bar-Isaac, Heski & Gavazza, Alessandro, 2015. "Brokers’ contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60731, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:60731
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    Cited by:

    1. I-Chun Tsai, 2021. "Price Rigidity and Vacancy Rates: The Framing Effect on Rental Housing Markets," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 63(4), pages 547-564, November.
    2. Alcalde, Pilar & Vial, Bernardita, 2022. "Implicit trade‐offs in replacement rates: Consumer preferences for firms, intermediaries and annuity attributes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    3. Sharat Ganapati, 2025. "The Modern Wholesaler: Global Sourcing, Domestic Distribution, and Scale Economies," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-40, February.
    4. Philippe Bracke, 2013. "House Prices and Rents: Micro Evidence from a Matched Dataset in Central London_x0003_," ERSA conference papers ersa13p112, European Regional Science Association.
    5. Lawrence Kryzanowski & Yanting Wu & Tingyu Zhou, 2023. "Conflicts of interest and agent heterogeneity in buyer brokerage," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 51(1), pages 130-169, January.
    6. Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Jean-François Houde & Shaoteng Li & Anna Trubnikova, 2025. "The Role of Intermediaries in Selection Markets: Evidence from Mortgage Lending," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 38(11), pages 3284-3328.
    7. Philippe Bracke, 2021. "How Much Do Investors Pay for Houses?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(S1), pages 41-73, March.
    8. Dean, Jason & Steele, Marion, 2022. "Income decline, financial insecurity, landlord screening and renter mobility," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    9. Pasquini, Ricardo A., 2021. "Effects of regulating the brokerage commission in the rental market: Evidence from Buenos Aires," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    10. Luis A. Lopez, 2024. "Is there a Principal-Agency Problem with Real Estate Agents in Rental Markets?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 29-69, July.
    11. Han, Lu & Strange, William C., 2016. "What is the role of the asking price for a house?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 115-130.
    12. Niedermayer, Andras & Wang, Chengsi, 2018. "A search model of rental markets: Who should pay the commission?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 214-235.
    13. Jeremy Gabe & Spenser Robinson & Andrew Sanderford, 2022. "Willingness to Pay for Attributes of Location Efficiency," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 384-418, October.

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    • N0 - Economic History - - General

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