Marriage Formation with Assortative Meeting as a Two-Sided Optimal Stopping Problem
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- E. M. Parilina & A. Tampieri, 2013. "Marriage Formation with Assortative Meeting as a Two-Sided Optimal Stopping Problem," Working Papers wp886, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordssecretary problem; random meeting; assortative meeting;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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